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Dear Professor Alexander: 
 
Enclosed please find the paper titled “Competition or manipulation? An empirical evidence 
from natural experiments on the earnings persistence of US banks” that we are re-
submitting to Journal of Banking & Finance. 
 
In the revised version of the paper, we carefully addressed most of the comments raised 
by the referees, and also explained those comments that are beyond the scope of the 
paper. We added a number of new tables in the paper according to the recommendations 
of the referees. We also re-structured the paper to make sure it reads better. We have 
strong faith that the paper is significantly improved after the revision process, under the 
help of you, the editor, and both the referees. 
 
We appreciate your consideration.  
 
Best regards, 
 
Hong Liu (on behalf of the co-authors) 
 
Senior Lecturer in Accounting and Finance 
Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, UK 
7 December, 2017 
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Competition or manipulation? An empirical evidence of determinants of the 
earnings persistence of the U.S. banks 
 
Our responses to the referees (6 December 2017) 
 
We outline the details that we have addressed each of your comments and suggestions. We 
reprint your feedback in italics for your convenience. Page and table numbers refer to the 
new draft of the paper. In this response, we only include full references to papers not 
mentioned in the paper. 
 
Reviewer 1 Comments  
Question about contributions  
The strategy and the findings of this paper are very very close to what Jiang, Levine and 
Lin (RFS, 2016) have done for the sample of bank holding companies in the U.S using gravity 
models. What makes this paper different would be constructing a clean and appealing 
natural experiment design; examining how these competition laws affect different types of 
banks and the mechanism of the effects. The authors partly dealt with the third part - 
mechanism of the effects but have not addressed the first two issues sufficiently. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for your helpful comments. We agree that we adopt a similar 
method to Jiang, Levine and Lin (2016), however, the main research questions of these two 
papers are quite different. In Jiang, Levine, and Lin (2016), they examine the impact of bank 
competition on bank opacity, as measured by earnings management. In our paper, the main 
research question is to investigate which factor has more impact on bank earnings 
persistence, bank competition or earnings management. The economic rationale which drives 
the motivation of our paper is from two different strands of literature, one is from economics 
and the other is from accounting. The two strands of literature argue that competition and 
earnings management are the main drivers of earnings persistence, respectively. The details 
of the arguments are in the second paragraph of the introduction section. Hence, our study is 
to reconcile the differences between these theories that explain the main driving force of bank 
earnings persistence, as highlighted in the third paragraph of the introduction section.  
We thus believe that our paper has its own contribution to the literature and is 
fundamentally different from the existing literature, including Jiang, Levine and Lin (2016). 
*Detailed Response to Reviewers
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In the revised version of the paper, however, we highlighted the difference between earnings 
management and earnings persistence to avoid further confusion.  
 
 
 
Bank location and treatment effects 
In the paper, the authors collect data of all banks across U.S states and evaluate how 
interstate branching deregulation affects their earnings adjustment speed. Then, it is 
essential to see how the authors collect and match bank locations. Did the authors only use 
headquarter office locations? If so, it would be naïve to trust the results as some big banks 
may have many branches across states, and the identification strategy would be back to what 
Jiang, Levine and Lin (RFS, 2016) have done in the case of BHCs. 
The main effects found in this paper is because banks face with higher entry from rivals 
from out-of state banks, hence, to have a clean treatment effect, the authors need to either 
constrain the data sample to single state banks or use branch level data. I also suspect that 
the main effects in this paper would be driven by small and medium banks as they are the one 
who are most affected from the branching deregulation. If so, an analysis which focuses on 
small and medium banks would make the paper more interesting. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for this helpful comment. In contrast to the use of BHCs level 
data in Jiang, Levine and Lin (RFS, 2016) who use BHC level data, we use data of 
commercial bank level, many of which are likely to be single-state banks. For your 
convenience, we highlight some descriptive statistics for comparison. Our sample contains 
15,546 distinct banks, which is 17 times the number of banks (911 banks) in the sample of 
Jiang et al (2016). The median bank size is $92 million in our sample, which is around 12 
times less than that ($1,067 million) of Jiang et al (2016). 
In the revised version of the paper, we conduct two robust analyses to consider the 
potential bias by banks operating in multiple states. First, we restrict our sample to those 
banks with only one branch. Second, we use a sub-sample of banks with size below USD 100 
million. We report the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5A. The results are consistent with 
our main findings reported in the paper. 
 
IBBEA and its real effects 
The authors claim that they follow Rice and Strahan (2010) to construct the interstate 
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branching restriction index but their index actually seems to be a reversed version of Rice 
and Strahan (2010) (i.e. in Rice and Strahan 2010, a higher index value implies more 
restrictions and thus, lower competition). I suggest the authors call their index a 
"Geographic Expansion Index" or something else to avoid misunderstandings. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for your suggestion. We have changed the name of “interstate 
branching restriction index” into "Geographic Expansion Index" across the whole paper.  
 
The institutional background for the passage of the IBBEA is poorly described. I suggest 
the authors appropriately review the current papers on the effect of IBBEA and provide 
arguments while this can be exogenous with respect to earnings persistence. 
 
Our reply: 
Many thanks for your suggestion. We now added more institutional background of 
IBEEA on pages 7 and 8 of the paper: Quoting the third paragraph on page 7, “The passage 
of IBBEA mainly involve the relaxation of four restrictions: (1) Age restriction: State could 
impose a minimum existence year for banks that seeking to enter (max 5 years). Many states 
set their age requirement at 5 years, while several states set a lower age requirement (eg.3 
years) or no minimum age limit at all. (2) De novo interstate branching restriction: State 
could disallow de novo interstate bank branching. Without de novo interstate bank branching, 
an out-of-state bank may only open one branch in that state. This makes entry into a 
particular out-of-state market particularly difficult. (3) Individual branching acquisition 
restriction: in an interstate merger transaction, States could require an out-of-state bank 
(Bidder) to acquire all branches of an in-state bank(Asker). Like de novo branching, 
permitting acquisition of individual branches lowers the cost of entry for interstate banks. (4) 
Statewide cap on deposits restriction: States could restrict the maximum fraction of deposits 
that an out-of-state bank could hold. Officially, a cap of 30% is suggested by IBBEA, but 
each state remains discretion to change it. State could set deposit cap to prevent a large in-
state bank from entering into an interstate merge. For example, if a state sets a deposit cap of 
20%, a bank in that state with more than 20% statewide deposits fraction could not be 
acquired.”  
Natural Experiment and Identification Strategy The use of a natural experiment (NE) 
requires that in the absence of deregulation, treatment and control groups follow similar 
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trends. The authors deal with this requirement by showing the insignificant effect of pre-
treatment dummies on the dependent variables. This only partly addresses the validity of the 
NE design. Actually, the NE design does not require the similarity in levels of the outcomes 
before the treatment but it does require an indistinguishable trend in both outcomes and 
other pre-determined covariates. The best way to deal with this is plotting parallel trend 
graphs of the average growth rates/changes of discretionary loan loss provisions, all bank 
control variables and state level economic variables. One suggestion would be assigning 
states that require all 4 restriction methods as the control group and other states as treatment 
to visualize the parallel trends. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for this helpful comment. We fully agree with what you suggested 
to test the parallel trend of dependent and independent variables. Please allow us to clarify 
that the dependent variable of our main regression is bank earnings persistence, rather than 
the average growth/change of discretionary loan loss provisions. The partial adjustment 
model does not allow us to estimate the true value of bank earnings persistence. We have 
provided further explanations for our partial adjustment model in section 3.4 of the revised 
version of the paper. In equation (7), the adjustment speed, λ, is a function of bank and 
macroeconomic characteristics. By substituting equation (7) into equation (2) yields the final 
estimable specification of the partial adjustment model as in equation (8) with dynamic 
adjustment speed, λit. Hence, the adjustment speed, λ, is not observable in the empirical 
analysis. We do apologize for the confusions caused in our earlier version of the paper.  
The use of the interstate bank branching deregulations from 1994 to 1997 as a natural 
experiment is widely adopted in the bank competition literature (Krishnan, Nandy, and Puri, 
2014; Black and Strahan, 2002; Dick and Lehnert, 2010; Beck, Levine and Levkov, 2010, 
among others). Thus, we follow the extant literature on this practice, and use the Geographic 
Expansion Index as exogenous variations to bank earnings persistence in this paper.  
 
 
The sample that authors use may encounter compound treatment effects as there are 
some other regulations that may affect bank earnings management during this period. One 
important change, for example, the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which is also known as 
the financial service modernization act, would also affect bank information transparency. 
How would the authors isolate the impact? Further categorizing banks based on holding 
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company status, size, trading and banking activities would be necessary. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for this comment. We assume what you quoted in the comment 
“bank earnings management” is meant to be “bank earnings persistence” since the latter is 
the focus of our paper. We agree that the GLB Act of 1999 may have significant impact on 
bank competition (Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan and Wilson, 2015), and hence on earnings 
persistence. It is empirically difficult to disentangle the effect of GLB Act from the impact of 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 since the impact of 
both Acts may have overlapping time periods immediately after 1999. We considered the 
possibility of categorizing banks based on holding company status (i.e., the commercial 
bank’s parent’s organization structure), size, trading and banking activities, as you suggested. 
We are concerned, however, that these two Acts’ impacts on bank competition may have 
influenced banks of all categories, and thus do not allow us to disentangle the effect of one 
Act from that of the other. To address this issue, we repeat our main regression analysis using 
the sub-sample before year 1999 in order to have a clean analysis of the impact of IBBEA of 
1994. The results are reported in column 7 of Table 5A of the revised version of the paper 
and are consistent with our main findings.  
 
 
The full sample of the paper includes 226,153 bank-year observations over the period of 
1986-2013 with the focus on the ten-year around the passage of the IBBEA would be too long 
and may produce artificially small standard errors as in Bertrand et al. (2004). The authors 
would need to refer to the solutions in Bertrand et al. (2004) such as collapsing data into a 
single pre and post period for each bank and report the results in robustness tests (at least). 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for this helpful comment. Following your suggestion, we have 
conducted a robustness test using event difference-in-difference strategy. According to 
Bertrand and Mullianathan (2003), and Chemmanur, He and Nandy(2009), this method could 
effectively capture the dynamic variation of difference between treatment and control group 
around a particular event.  
We treat the introduction year of IBBEA for each state as our event year. We use the 
following model to test the dynamic impact from IBBEA on earnings adjustment speed: 
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ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Before
t+∑Aftert+γZit-1) GAPit-1+  it,  
where GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1, Before
t 
(After
t
) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years 
before (after) the introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before
5
 equals 1 for 
year 5 before a particular state’s deregulation introduction year, and 0 otherwise. The results 
are reported in Table 5B of the revised version of the paper. We find that the coefficients on 
After
1
, After
2
, After
3
, After
4
 are all positive and statistically significant. This finding shows 
that after the introduction of deregulation, banks accelerate earnings adjustment speed. This 
effect is most pronounced 2 and 3 years after the introduction year.  
 
 
Level of clustering 
The authors cluster standard errors at both bank and year level which is not correct. 
What happen if the authors cluster standard errors at state level, or at least, state*year level? 
I suspect that this would make the results less significant. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for this comment. In the revised version of the paper, we repeat 
our main regressions by clustering standard errors at different levels. The results are reported 
in columns 7 to 9 of Table 5A.  Consistent with your expectation, we find that the t-statistic 
for testing the coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is the smallest when we cluster 
standard errors at the state level (3.80), while the t-statistic is the highest when we cluster 
standard errors at the bank level (12.01). However, our main results are robust with using 
different levels of clustered standard errors. The coefficients of Geographic Expansion Index 
across column (7) to column (9) continue to be statistically significant at the 1% level.   
 
 
Mechanism 
The authors provide interesting results that competition affects earnings persistence not 
through earning management mechanism. Then the authors should back up the results by 
outlining what mechanism would it be. I do not have a strong suggestion for this but this is 
the story that the authors need to tell. 
 
Our reply: 
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We do apologize for the confusion caused to the referee. Let’s make some clarification 
here. The main research question of this paper is to examine which factor is the main driving 
force of bank earnings persistence, competition or earnings management. We find that both 
factors are important determinants of bank earnings persistence. We suspect, however, that 
the impact of bank competition on earnings persistence is not direct, but rather indirectly 
going through the channel of earnings management. We conducted two analyses in Section 5 
to investigate this question. First, we show that bank competition has positive impact on bank 
earnings management as measured by Discretionary loan loss provisions. This result 
invalidates the indirect channel because otherwise we would have observed a negative impact 
of bank competition on earnings persistence, which is not what we find in the main 
regressions. Second, we show that bank competition has no significant impact on earnings 
management as modelled by realized gains and losses of AFS securities. This result again 
invalidates the indirect channel. Based on the results in section 5, we then conclude that the 
impact of bank competition on bank earnings persistence is direct rather than indirect. In the 
revised version of the paper, we dropped the word “mechanism” to avoid further confusions.  
 
 
Alternative competition measure 
The authors use an adjusted Lerner Index to back up the deregulation index and claim 
that this is important as it measures bank level competition. I do not agree with this view as 
deregulation is at the market level, and if something can be used as an alternative, it should 
be a market level variable. It is up to the authors whether they want to keep the results using 
the Lerner index, but I believe that another robustness check using HHI is needed to see 
through the mechanism of the effect. I suggest an IV approach using deregulation index as an 
instrument for market competition HHI measurement and regress the earning adjustment 
speed on the predicted HHI to see if competition really decreases earnings persistence. 
 
Our reply: 
We do agree with you that Lerner index is a bank level variable while Geographic 
expansion index is a market level variable. Hence, in the revised version of the paper, we 
have decided not to include the results of Lerner index.  
However, we follow your constructive suggestion and use Geographic Expansion Index 
as an IV to HHI. Table 1 of this revision letter reports the 2SLS regression results. In the first 
stage, we use Geographic Expansion Index as an instrument for the HHI measurement of 
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market-level competition, which reflects deregulation at the market-level, and obtain fitted 
HHI for each state in each year. We find that Geographic Expansion Index significantly 
reduces state HHI. In the second stage, we regress the earning adjustment speed on the fitted 
HHI. We find that the fitted state HHI has a negative and significant impact on earnings 
adjustment speed. Because a higher fitted HHI indicates a lower level of competition, this 
result is consistent with our main finding in the paper.  This table is however not included in 
the revised version of the paper to save space, but can be added back if you feel necessary. 
 
Minor comments 
GDP growth rate and per capita income can be highly correlated; I am surprised that 
the authors use both those two variables in one specification. 
 
Our reply: 
To address this concern, we compute the correlation matrix and find that the correlation 
coefficient between GDP growth rate and GDP per capita is -0.3128, which is rather 
moderate in magnitude. Nevertheless, we follow your advice and conduct tests based on only 
using one of the two macro variables and report the results in Table 2 of this response letter. 
Overall, the results are consistent with what we report in the paper. This table is not included 
in the revised version of the paper to save space, but can be added back if you feel necessary.  
 
Some typos are in the reference list. 
 
Our reply: 
We now have corrected the mistakes in the references. 
 
Reviewer 2 Comments 
 
Main comments: 
-       The impact of competition on banks' earnings adjustment speed may be different 
when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0) and the influence of 
competition on the bank earnings management variables may also differ between these two 
cases. The authors should consider that in their model. 
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Our reply: 
We would like to thank you for this valuable comment, which has encouraged us to 
conduct further analyses to investigate the impact of competition on banks' earnings 
adjustment speed and bank earnings management when the bank is above or below its ROA 
target, respectively.   
In Table 4 of the revised version of the paper, we further examine the effect of 
competition on bank earnings adjustment speed using sub-samples (GAP>0 and GAP<0). 
We find that the coefficients on Geographic Expansion index remains positive and significant 
in both sub-samples. It suggests that competition consistently erodes away the economic 
excessive returns (GAP<0) and expel losses (GAP>0) (Stigler,1961).  
In Table 7 of the revised version of the paper, we also examine the effect of competition 
on bank earnings management using sub-samples (GAP>0 and GAP<0). We find that the 
impact of competition on earnings management is mainly driven by outperforming banks 
which have higher ROA than their targets (GAP<0). It indicates that outperforming banks 
have more incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid sudden drops in earnings.  
We have updated the discussion of the results on page 14 (Section 4.1) and page 18 
(Section 5.1) in the revised version of the paper.  
 Please also notice that we have followed the suggestion of reviewer 1 and renamed “the 
interstate branching restriction index” to “Geographic Expansion Index”. 
 
-       In the data section, the authors explain that they consider the 1986-2013 period but 
explain just after that in their main analysis they focus on "the ten-year period in which no 
more than five years are distant from the IBBEA introduction year in each state". This is not 
clear and information about the date of introduction of the IBBEA in each state should be 
provided. Are there important differences? Page 14, they state that the introduction of IBBEA 
lasts from 1994 to 1997 and that they consider "the time period from 1989 to 2002, a ten-
year window". This is not a ten-year window. This should be clarified. Besides, can the 
values of the Branching Restriction index vary after the introduction of IBBEA and is it taken 
into account when the 1986-2013 period is considered? 
 
Our reply: 
We have re-written the data section (page 13) to make the description clearer in Section 
4.1 in the revised version of the paper. In our analysis in Table 4, we use 5 years before and 
after the introduction of each state to examine the effect of IBBEA on earnings persistence. 
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Different states adopt the regulation change in different years. For example, Ohio State 
instantly relieved all restrictions on the 21th May 1997, therefore the data for Ohio spans a 
ten-year window from 1992 to 2002. On the other hand, Washington State firstly relieved 
state deposit cap restriction on the 6th June 1996 and then gradually relieved other 
restrictions in following years. Since we consider a 10 year window around the introduction 
of IBBEA, the ten-year window for Washington hence spans from 1991 to 2001. The overall 
time period for all states thus spans from 1989 to 2002.  
Next, we use the full sample from 1986-2013 to examine the overall impact of 
Geographic Expansion Index on earnings persistence in column 3 of Table 5A (a new table in 
the revised version). The results are consistent with those reported earlier.  
 
-       Among the determinants of the adjustment speed, the authors consider competition 
and earnings management through Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As they consider 
realized gains and losses on Available for Sale Securities as an alternative measure of 
earnings management, they should also consider this variable among the determinants of the 
adjustment speed. The interpretation of this variable would be possible if they separate the 
cases with GAP<0 or >0 as suggested in my first comment. 
 
Our reply: 
We apologize for the confusions on the interpretation of the AFS model. In the model of 
Barth et al (2017), realized gain and loss of AFS (AFS thereafter) is the dependent variable, 
while Net Income (NI) is the independent variable. A negative and significant coefficient of 
NI indicates a negative relation between NI and AFS, which is an evidence that banks use 
AFS to smooth earnings (see Barth et al (2017), pages 12-13 for detailed explanations). One 
drawback of this model, however, is that it does not allow us to quantify the degree of 
earnings management. As a result, we are not able to conduct the regression analyses similar 
to those we do in Table 4.  
Nevertheless, we are able to find significant and negative coefficients of NI in Table 8 
of the paper, which suggest that there exists earnings smoothing via AFS in our sample. 
Further, the negative and significant coefficient of NI*Competition suggests that banks 
engaged more earnings smoothing when competition is high. We then repeat the regressions 
by using the sub-samples when GAP >0 and GAP<0, respectively. The results reported in 
Table 8 of the revised version of the paper are consistent with those obtained from using the 
full sample.  
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-       The authors test the direct link between competition and earnings persistence 
taking into account the impact of earnings management and then regress earnings 
management on competition. To see whether competition affects earnings persistence 
through earnings management, I think that the authors should rather consider the adjustment 
model with competition, earnings management and the interaction between the two variables. 
Besides, I do not understand what is expected when realized gains and losses on Available 
for Sale Securities are regressed on competition. Indeed, the expected impact depends on 
whether the bank is above or below the target of ROA. 
 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for your suggestion. We followed your idea and include the 
interaction term between earnings management and competition in our baseline regression. 
Results are shown in Table 3 of this response letter, we found the coefficient on the 
interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index*DLLP is statistically insignificant. This 
result further suggests that the effect of competition on earnings persistence does not go 
through the earnings management channel.  
We apologize again for the ambiguous interpretation of the AFS model in section 5.2 of 
the previous version. We have rewritten the section to make it clearer.  
 
-       In the first placebo test, only the variable Before(4,1) should be added, not the 
early deregulation index that corresponds to the third robustness check. 
Our reply: 
Thank you very much for your comment and the analysis of early deregulation index has 
now been deleted from the revised version of the paper. 
 
Minor comments: 
1) All the equations should be numbered (cf page 9 and 10) 
 
We have re-numbered all equations accordingly. 
 
2) The equation for AFS securities page 10 is not correct, coefficients are missing. 
Besides, the title of section 3.5 is not good as the measure of earnings management 
is not available for sale securities (AFS) but realized gains and losses on AFS. 
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We do apologize for the typo. The missing coefficients are added. We then 
dropped section 3.5 and moved the content to section 5.2 to keep a smooth paper 
flow.  
 
3) In 3.4, the authors do not explain how the impact of competition on earnings 
management is taken into account; however, they do so for the other proxy of 
earnings management in 3.5. This should be harmonized.  
 
We now have added a paragraph on page 17 in section 5 of the paper to explain the 
rationale and impact of competition on earnings management. Starting with “In this 
subsection we examine the direct impact of bank competition on bank earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions….conditions…….” 
 
4) In 3.6, details about the way equations are estimated should be given. Do they use 
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimation techniques? 
 
We use Fama-Macbech regression for the first stage estimation, and OLS with 
fixed effects for the second stage estimation. We have rewritten the methodology 
part of partial adjustment model to make clearer explanations.  
Now it is explained on page 11, section 3.4. Starting with “We follow Healy et al, 
(2014) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) to estimate Equation(8) in two steps. In 
the first step, we use Fama-Macbeth regression on Equation (5) and obtain an 
estimate of target ROA (ROA*) (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; Healy et al, 
2014)…..” 
 
5) Restrictions put on the sample of banks are not presented. For example, have the 
authors removed very small banks? Have they kept foreign-owned banks? What is 
the minimum amount of total assets? In the summary statistics table, the scale for 
size and other variables is not given. 
 
We exclude foreign banks and banks with total assets lower than one million US 
dollars from our sample. It has been updated in the revised version of the paper 
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(section 3.1 on page 6). For clarity, we also add the accounting figure of total assets 
in Table 1.  
 
6) Page 13, the comment on the correlation between Branching Restriction Index and 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provision is not correct as a higher index indicates 
higher competition. 
 
We have now corrected this error. 
 
7) Page 17, the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive; not negative. 
 
We have consolidated this analysis into section 4.3 and report the results in Table 6. 
Earnings adjustment speed is negatively related to these interaction terms, which 
indicates that banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, higher 
managerial efficiency and lower level of default risk could persist earnings longer 
(Page 17 on the revised version). 
 
8) Only references that are mentioned in the text should be put in the references 
section. 
 
The references have been carefully checked and updated.  
 
9) The authors could provide summary statistics before and after the introduction of 
the IBBEA. 
 
In the revised version of the paper we have added the mean value of variables 
before and after the introduction of IBBEA in Panel B of Table 1.   
 
10) Details about the computation of the Z-score should be given. For example, how 
many years are considered to compute the standard deviation? 
 
In the Appendix (definition of variables), we added the description of Z-score to 
show that we use 3-year rolling window to estimate standard deviation of ROA. 
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Table 1 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: IV 
This table presents 2SLS regression results. In Column (1), we use Branching Restriction index as an instrument 
for state HHI. In Column (2) and Column (3) we use the fitted value of state HHI as a new competition measure. 
For second stage partial adjustment model (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1) GAPit-1 +  it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - 
ROAit-1), we assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. Column (2) presents OLS results of a sub-sample of ten-year window around IBBEA introduction, 
while Column (3) presents OLS results of full sample. Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are the proxy for 
earnings management across all columns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 
First Stage  Second Stage 
  (1) (2) (3)    
Branching Restrictions Index -0.008*** 
  
 
(-3.44) 
  Fitted state HHI  
 
-1.333*** -0.230*** 
  
(-3.23) (-7.22)    
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions -0.016* -0.016*** 
  
(-1.81) (-4.62)    
Z-score 
 
0.009 -0.055*** 
  
(0.49) (-16.35)    
Leverage Ratio 0.032*** 0.007**  
  
(2.90) (2.03)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.010 -0.004    
  
(-1.50) (-1.04)    
Size 
 
-0.062*** -0.027*** 
  
(-4.19) (-9.68)    
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.006 0.000    
  
(1.07) (0.09)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.033*** 0.041*** 
  
(6.37) (15.20)    
Income Diversification 0.004 -0.012*** 
  
(0.95) (-5.12)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.015*** -0.012*** 
  
(-2.63) (-5.45)    
Inflation 
 
0.035*** 0.004    
  
(3.31) (1.61)    
GDP Per Capita -0.214*** -0.033*** 
  
(-4.58) (-5.24)    
Constant 
 
1.100*** 0.901*** 
  
(29.34) (158.41)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes No No 
F-statistics 19.18 
  N 226153 77929 226153    
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Table 2 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: GDP growth rate and GDP per capita  
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. 
This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - 
ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1) GAPit-1 +  it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) . Column (1) shows the result using a 
subsample of banks with only one branch, Column(2) shows the result using a subsample of banks with total 
assets smaller than 100 million USD. Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are the proxy for earnings 
management across all columns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.  
  GDP per capita only GDP growth only 
Branching Restrictions Index 0.092*** 0.089*** 
 
(4.54) (3.76)    
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 
(-2.62) (-2.70)    
Z-score -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 
(-3.54) (-3.48)    
Leverage Ratio 0.015** 0.016**  
 
(2.52) (2.56)    
Loan to Total Asset -0.017** -0.017**  
 
(-2.37) (-2.31)    
Size -0.075*** -0.074*** 
 
(-7.10) (-6.96)    
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.009* 0.008    
 
(1.67) (1.48)    
Managerial Efficiency 0.031*** 0.030*** 
 
(5.82) (5.69)    
Income Diversification -0.000 0.000    
 
(-0.02) (0.05)    
Inflation -0.002 0.010    
 
(-0.30) (0.91)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.014** 
 
 
(-2.27) 
 GDP Per Capita -0.032 
  
(-0.87) 
Constant -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-33.75) (-34.05)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 77929 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.8252 0.8251 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Interaction between competition and 
earnings management 
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. 
This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - 
ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1) GAPit-1 +  it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) . Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are the 
proxy for earnings management across all columns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) 
Branching Restrictions index*DLLP 0.526    
 
(0.67)    
Branching Restrictions index 0.011*** 
 
(2.76) 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions -0.137*** 
 
(-5.34) 
Z-score -0.036*** 
 
(-7.30) 
Capital Ratio 0.012*** 
 
(3.70) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.008 
 
(-1.41) 
Size -0.075*** 
 
(-9.23) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.006* 
 
(1.76) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.122** 
 
(-2.25) 
Income Diversification -0.006 
 
(-1.51) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.016*** 
 
(-4.77) 
Inflation -0.025*** 
 
(-8.31) 
GDP Per Capita -0.023*** 
 
(-3.21) 
Constant 0.892*** 
 
(83.67) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
N 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.8315 
 
Competition or manipulation? An empirical evidence of 
determinants of the earnings persistence of the U.S. banks  
 
Chi-Hsiou D. Hung
a
, Yuxiang Jiang
a
, Frank Hong Liu
a*
, Hong Tu
b 
 
This version: December 9, 2017 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence by exploiting a natural 
experiment following interstate banking deregulation that increased bank competition. We find 
that bank earnings adjustment speed increases after the state where the bank locates implements 
the deregulation.  This relationship is weakened, however, with the increase of banks’ abilities to 
sustain earnings, as reflected in size, diversification, managerial efficiency and safety. We further 
find that compeititon directly impacts bank earnings adjustment speed, and does not indirectly go 
through the channel of earnings management.  
 
Keywords: Competition; Geographic Expansion Index; Earnings persistence; Earnings 
adjustment speed, Earnings management 
JEL Classification: G20, G21, G38 
 
 
 
a       Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow  
b School of Finance, Nankai University 
 
*    Corresponding author: Frank Hong Liu; University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, 
      Room 471, Gilbert Scott Building, Glasgow G12 8QQ, E-Mail: Hong.Liu@glasgow.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
*Title Page (with authors and affiliations)
1 
 
Competition or manipulation? An empirical evidence of 
determinants of the earnings persistence of the U.S. banks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence by exploiting a 
natural experiment following interstate banking deregulation that increased bank 
competition. We find that bank earnings adjustment speed increases after their states 
implement the deregulation.  This relationship is weakened, however, with the increase of 
bank’s abilities to sustain earnings, as reflected in size, diversification, managerial 
efficiency and safety. We further find that the impact of compeititon on bank earnings 
adjustment speed is direct but not indirectly through the channel of earnings management.  
 
Keywords: Competition; Geographic Expansion Index; Earnings persistence; 
Earnings adjustment speed, Earnings management 
JEL Classification: G20, G21, G38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
2 
 
1. Introduction  
Financial crisis raises the recent intense debate on the association between 
accounting changes and financial crisis. For instance, the accusation of market value 
accounting after the 2007-2009 financial crisis, along with the economic significance of 
banks’ liquidity and capital provision requirements, reveals the vital economic role of bank 
accounting (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Bank earnings persistence plays an important role in 
maintaining the stability of the whole financial system and so has attracted growing debate 
on the factors that drive such a phenomenon (Cumming et al., 2012; Beaver et al., 2012; 
Gao and Zhang, 2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui et al, 2016; Buchner et al., 2016).  
According to economic competition theory, competition contributes to the mean 
reversion of market profitability (decreased earnings persistence) in the long term (Stigler, 
1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). In other words, 
competition could erode away all excessive returns by attracting new entrants or all 
excessive losses by forcing the improvement of operations or exit of the market. Thus, 
competition could directly reduce earnings persistence. However, accounting studies 
implicitly suggest that earnings persistence is a result of earnings management (Sloan, 
1993; Pope and Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011; 
Li, 2010; Healy et al., 2015).  
Few studies have attempted to reconcile the differences between theories that 
explain the main driving force of bank earnings persistence. It is possible that, as an 
effective external governance mechanism, competition could reduce earnings management 
via increasing the cost of mispricing (Graham et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Burks et 
al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016). Hence, the resulted reduced earnings persistence is the result 
of decreased earnings management caused by the increased competition. It is thus the 
central focus of this paper to determine whether the impact of competition on bank 
earnings persistence is directly or indirectly from earnings management.  
We use a comprehensive data set of the US banking industry for the period between 
1986 and 2013 and our final sample includes 15,546 unique commercial banks with 
226,153 firm-year observations. The benefits of studying the banking industry are two-
fold: First, our focus on a single homogenous industry removes the challenges of defining 
the market where a firm competes, thereby removing the potential bias in industry 
identification that is overly broadly or unduly narrowly defined. Second, the focus of 
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analyzing the banking sector eliminates the concern on conglomerates that operate in 
different industries and thus face competitions in different markets.  
We use a partial adjustment model to capture bank earnings adjustment speed, which 
allows earnings targets to be bank-specific and to vary over time (see, also, Healy et al., 
2014; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; De Jonghe and Öztekin., 2015). Earnings adjustment 
speed refers to the speed by which banks adjust earnings to their target ROA, and equals 
one minus earnings persistence. Thus, faster adjustment speeds indicate lower earnings 
persistence. We estimate heterogeneous adjustment speeds via a two-stage procedure. In 
the first stage, we obtain a constant adjustment speed λ for each of the banks and estimate 
the target ROA for each bank-year. In the second stage, we use the gap between the target 
ROA and the observed realized ROA to obtain a time-varying adjustment speed for each 
bank in each year.  
We exploit the cross-state, time-varying variations in the removal of interstate bank 
branching prohibitions to identify an exogenous increase in bank competition. The 
introduction of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 by 
the US authorities relaxed geographical restrictions to bank expansion across state borders. 
This relaxation enhances competition by enabling banks to enter into new markets in other 
states, thereby allowing them to compete with those banks in the local market (DeYoung, 
2010; Rice and Strahan, 2010, among others). 
We start by investigating whether banks adjust their earnings with a faster speed in 
states that implement the IBBEA and deregulate interstate banking within their borders to a 
great extent. We find that an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index, which indicates 
an increase in bank competition, leads to an increase in bank earnings adjustment speed. 
This finding is in line with the prediction of the economic theory that competition reduces 
earnings persistence (Stigler, 1961).  
We also find that banks with higher earnings management, which is measured as 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, tend to have slower earnings adjustment speed than 
their peers. This finding is also in line with arguments in the existing accounting literature. 
These findings hold after controlling for state and time fixed effects, a wide array of 
time-varying bank characteristics, such as size, risk, capital-asset ratio, efficiency, and the 
macro-economic conditions, such as GDP growth, inflation and GDP per capita in each 
state. We also conduct a host of robustness tests to ensure that our findings are not driven 
by potential biases in the sample or alternative explanations. In our additional cross-
sectional analysis, we find that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment 
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speed is reduced with the increase of bank’s ability to sustain earnings, including size, 
diversification, managerial efficiency and safety. 
Next, we investigate whether the positive impact of competition on bank earnings 
adjustment speed goes through the earnings management channel. If this is the case, we 
would expect a negative impact of competition on bank earnings management, because 
thus a higher level of competition will induce lower earnings management, which will 
consequently lead to higher earnings adjustment speed. The literature on the relationship 
between firm competition and earnings management is ambiguous. The negative 
relationship argues that competition can act as an external governance mechanism to 
prevent managerial slack and protect the interest of shareholders (Dechow et al., 2010), 
and that competition increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing earnings 
management incentives (Graham et al., 2005). On the other hand, if the positive impact of 
competition on bank earnings adjustment speed does not go through the earnings 
management channel, we would expect a non-negative (positive or insignificant) impact of 
competition on bank earnings management. This is then consistent with another strand of 
literature which argues that increased competition could put higher pressure on managers 
and hence, induces their unethical behavior such as earnings management, giving rise to an 
empirically observed positive relation between competition and earnings management 
(Shleifer, 2004; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Bagnoli and 
Watts, 2010; Tomy, 2016; Dou et al., 2016).  
We conduct two analyses to examine whether competition has positive impact on 
bank earnings management by using two bank earnings management frameworks. First, we 
use discretionary loan loss provisions, which is widely used to measure earnings 
management in the banking industry (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2014; 
Cornett et al., 2009; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 2014). In our analyses, 
we find a positive relation between competition and discretionary loan loss provisions, 
which does not support the argument that the impact of competition on bank earnings 
adjustment speed goes indirectly through the channel of earnings management.  
Second, we consider the possibility that banks could use securities available for sale 
to smooth earnings, as suggested by the existing literature (Barth et al., 2015; Dong and 
Zhang, 2015). Available for Sale (AFS) securities is the largest category of banks’ 
securities that comprise a sizable proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; 
Laux and Leuz, 2010). Earnings management through realizing gains and losses on AFS 
securities is less costly than through managing accruals or involving in real activities 
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because sales of securities are not subject to ex post scrutiny, such as from auditors. These 
advantages may enable banks to continuously manage earnings despite the existence of 
competition. If this is the case, bank’s earnings management through AFS will be 
independent of bank competition. We find evidence to support this argument. Hence, the 
impact of competition on bank earnings persistence is rather directly than indirectly 
through the channel of earnings management. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our best knowledge, 
we are the first to document the causal relation between competition and earnings 
persistence by employing Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act as an 
exogenous shock. Prior studies tend to ignore the endogeneity with respect to the causal 
relation between competition and earnings persistence (Goddard et al., 2004; Gropp and 
Kashyap, 2010; Goddard et al., 2011). Recently, Healy et al. (2014) recognize that it is 
difficult to attribute causality between competition and earnings persistence, given many 
channels that drive competitive forces, such as government regulation. Therefore, our 
study fills this gap by employing a government regulation change which could impact bank 
competition as an exogenous shock.   
Second, we examine whether the competition law affects banks with different size, 
level of diversification, management efficiency, and level of default risk. We find that the 
stronger a bank is in sustaining earnings, as reflected by large size, better diversification, 
higher managerial efficiency and lower default risk, the lower is the impact of competition 
on bank earnings adjustment speed. Third, we provide evidence that the effect of 
competition on bank earnings persistence is direct, but not indirectly through the channel 
of earnings management.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents conceptual 
framework. In Section 3, we describe our identification strategy, sample construction, 
instruments, models and summary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses our main 
results and Section 5 conducts two additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual framework 
Economic scholars argue that competition directly impacts earnings persistence, 
where competition could erode away all economic excessive returns and losses in the long 
run and thus, the market profitability level will converge toward a long-term equilibrium 
(Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). More 
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specifically, the excessive profit currently possessed by a firm attracts new competitors to 
enter the market by offering similar or same product with lower prices, leading to 
decreases in the profit margin. This process will not stop until firms’ profitability reaches 
the average profit rate of the market. For firms with the profits under the market average 
will receive precaution from investors to reach the market average level in a short time. 
Otherwise, investors will withdraw their investment, resulting in the exit of the 
underperforming firms from the market. Thus, competition directly reduces earnings 
persistence.   
On the other hand, there is a widely accepted consensus that earnings persistence is 
a result of earnings management choice or earnings manipulation (Sloan, 1993; Pope and 
Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011). The 
underpinning rationale is that, with information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, firms smooth earnings for purposes like taxes minimization, dividend payouts, 
target achievements, hiding poor economic performance or avoidance of covenants (Guay 
et al., 1996; Arya et al., 1998; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Managers are also motivated to 
smooth reported earnings overtime to obtain relatively constant compensation (Gaver et 
al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Warfield et al., 1995; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). For instance, managers might manipulate earnings downward when 
bonuses have already reached maximum levels, and might manipulate earnings upward 
when the actual earnings are not qualified for a bonus plan. Subjecting to regulatory capital 
requirements, banks with lower regulatory capital are motivated to increase it. 
Consequently, banks might manipulate earnings to accomplish that objective (Barth et al., 
2015).  
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Data 
To explore the impact of competition and earnings management on earnings 
persistence, we combine data from several sources. From Federal Reserve Report of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports), we obtain the data of balance sheets and income 
statements at the commercial bank level, rather than their bank holding company levels. 
We exclude from our sample foreign banks and banks with total assets less than one 
million US dollars. Macroeconomic information is from World Bank database. Finally, our 
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full sample includes 15,546 banks with a total of 226,153 firm-year observations from 51 
states over the period of 1986-2013.  
 
3.2. The identification strategy of bank competition 
Prior studies use different measures, such as country survey index, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, and the Lerner Index, to measure competition at the country, industry, 
firm or product level (Healy et al., 2014; Goddard et al., 2004; Goddard et al., 2011; 
Berger et al., 2000). These measures, however, cannot address the endogeneity issues 
between competition and earnings persistence because unobservable cross-sectional 
heterogeneity could impact both competition and earnings persistence. On the other hand, 
reverse causality may also exist. For example, persistent earnings of the industry may 
indicate better business operations, continuous profits, increasing stock prices and lower 
debt costs (Lin et al., 2013) and hence, can attract new competitor entrants. Alternatively, 
persistent earnings of the firm may increase the capability of existing firms in preventing 
new entrants into the market, resulting in less competition.   
We use Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), which relaxes 
geographical restrictions on bank expansion crossing state borders enacted by the US 
authorities in 1994, as an exogenous shock to document the causality between competition 
and earnings persistence. Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was 
passed in 1994 and completed in 1997. It allows bank holding companies to acquire banks 
across states (effective in 1995) and to expand across states (effective in 1997) (Rice and 
Strahan, 2010). Regarded as the watershed event, IBBEA indicates the end of an era of 
geographic restrictions on bank expansion which could be traced back to the 19th century 
(Rice and Strahan, 2010).  
The passage of IBBEA mainly involves the relaxation of four restrictions: (1) Age 
restriction: State could impose a minimum existence year for banks that seek to enter. 
Many states set their age requirement at 5 years, while several states set a lower age 
requirement (eg.3 years) or no minimum age limit at all. (2) De novo interstate branching 
restriction: State could disallow de novo interstate bank branching, under which situation, 
all out-of-state banks could only open one branch in the focal state. This makes entry into 
certain out-of-state markets particularly difficult, because the potential of fast expansion of 
an out-of-state bank is significantly constrained. (3) Individual branching acquisition 
restriction: in an interstate merger transaction, States could require an out-of-state bank 
(Bidder) to acquire all branches of an in-state bank (Asker). Like de novo branching, 
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permitting acquisition of individual branches lowers the cost of entry for interstate banks. 
(4) Statewide cap on deposits restriction: States could restrict the maximum fraction of 
deposits that an out-of-state bank could hold. Officially, a cap of 30% is suggested by 
IBBEA, but each state maintains the discretion to change it. State could set a deposit cap to 
prevent a large in-state bank from entering into an interstate merger. For example, if a state 
sets a deposit cap of 20%, a bank in that state with more than 20% statewide deposits 
fraction could not be acquired.    
This Act allows states to erect barriers to branch expansion. However, some states 
make use of this provision by prohibiting out-of-state banks from opening or acquiring 
branches, by requiring the minimum age of bank branches that could be acquired, or by 
mandating the maximum amount of deposits that banks could hold. Therefore, IBBEA 
increases banks’ competition in each state while the magnitude of increased competition in 
each estate is different. Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we create a variable 
Geographic Expansion Index, which decreases with the extent of interstate branching 
deregulation restrictions in a state. Hence, an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index 
indicates an increase in bank competition.  
It is important to note that interstate bank deregulation is exogenous to bank earnings 
persistence. There is no empirical evidence to show that banks’ earnings persistence affects 
the timing of deregulation. Thus, the interstate bank deregulation Act tends to be a 
disordered act that provides a valuable research laboratory for assessing the influence of 
competition on banks’ earnings persistence. There are also extensive studies applying 
IBBEA as an exogenous shock to bank competition on topics of firm financing (Rice and 
Strahan, 2010), firm innovation (Cornaggia et al., 2015; Amore et al., 2013), bank liquidity 
(Shenoy and Williams, 2015) and market valuation of bank holding companies (Goetz et 
al., 2013), among others.  
 
3.3. Earnings management measure: Discretionary loan loss provision model 
Discretionary loan loss provision becomes the most common vehicle to manipulate 
bank earnings after the launch of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 
(short for SFAS 133), which requires firms to measure total assets and liabilities at fair 
value on the balance sheet (Liu and Ryan, 2006). We hence follow Beatty and Liao (2014), 
Cohen et al. (2014), Cornett et al. (2009) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) to use the 
discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) model to measure bank earnings management. 
The absolute value of the residual from estimating equation (1) as shown below represents 
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the degree of each bank’s earnings management. The error term represents the unexplained 
component of the regression and hence, is treated as the Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions (DLLP). 
Loan Loss Provisionit =   Sizeit +    ΔLoan Charge-offsit 
                                              ΔLoansit     ΔNon-performing Loansit   
                                               ΔNon-performing Loansit-1  
                                           ΔNon-performing Loansit+1 +       (1)               
where Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets, ΔLoan Charge-offsit represents the 
difference in total loan charge-offs between periods t and t-1, ΔLoansit represents the 
difference in total loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit reflects the 
change in non-performing loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit-1 
reflects the change in non-performing loans between periods t-1 and t-2, and ΔNon-
performing Loansit+1 represents the change in non-performing loans between periods t+1 
and t. All the variables except Size in Equation (1) are deflated by the book value of total 
assets of each bank.  
 
 
3.4. Earnings adjustment speed: The partial adjustment model 
A number of studies use a first-order autoregressive model to capture the dynamics 
of firm’s earnings (Mueller, 1990; Jenny and Weber, 1990). This model can only produce a 
time-invariant persistence level for each entity. However, the persistence level of each 
entity in every year may not remain unchanged. In order to improve the estimation 
accuracy, several studies adopt partial adjustment model to obtain time-varying persistence 
level for each entity (Healey et al., 2014; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Memmel and Raupach, 
2010; De Jonghe and Öztehin, 2015). We follow these studies and employ the partial 
adjustment model to estimate the dynamic persistence level for each bank in each year. 
In the partial adjustment model, the bank’s current return level (ROA) is a weighted 
average of its target and its previous year’s ROA: 
ROAit - ROAit-1  = λi(ROA*it - ROAit-1) + εit,                                     (2) 
where ROAit is the return on total assets of bank i in year t. ROA*it is the target ROA of 
bank i in year t. λi represents the proportional adjustment for bank i. In our context, λi 
captures the exw a bank operates away from its target ROA. Alternatively, ROA is 
predicted to mean revert to a target level, ROA*. Therefore, bank earnings adjustment 
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speed refers to the speed at which banks’ earnings adjust to their target ROA and equals 1 
minus earnings persistence. The ROA* can be determined by a cross-sectional model: 
ROA*it = βi Xit + εit,                                                                           (3) 
where Xit is a vector of the bank and macroeconomic characteristics influencing ROA. 
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2) and rearranging yields Equation (4) below: 
ROAit =λi  Xit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+                                                   (4)         
 Equation (4) shows that in the partial adjustment model, the bank’s current ROA is 
a weighted average (with λi between 0 and 1) of ROA in its previous period, the 
unobserved fixed effects and random shocks. If the value of λi is small, the adjustment 
speed is slow, suggesting that it takes a long time for a bank to reach its target ROA after a 
shock to its ROA. On the other hand, known as an inertial fact in the partial adjustment 
model, (1- λi) represents the earnings persistence level. The smaller value of adjustment 
speed indicates a higher level of earnings persistence. When (1 - λi) equals 1, the 
adjustment speed equals 0, indicating that the earnings level is unchanged. In contrast, 
when (1 - λi) equals 0, the adjustment speed equals 1, suggesting that there is no earnings 
persistence because the speed of adjustment to the target ROA is instant. 
In the partial adjustment model, the target ROA (ROA*) is unobservable and is not 
necessarily constant over periods. Therefore, we employ the cross-sectional model 
proposed by Fama and French (2006) to estimate the target ROA
1
.  
ROA
*
it =      Income Diversificationit +   Non-Performing Loansit  
                +   Revenueit +   Capital Ratioit +   Sizeit  
                        +   Management Efficiencyit   +   Loansit +              (5) 
where Income Diversification is the non-interest income to total revenue ratio, the variable 
of Non-performing Loans is the non-performing loans to total asset ratio, Revenue is total 
revenue to total asset ratio and the Capital Ratio is total equity to total assets ratio, Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Management Efficiency is calculated via total costs 
divided by total revenues, and Loans is the total net loans over total assets. We employee 
Fama-Macbeth estimation in this first stage estimation (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; 
Healy et al, 2014).  
The above model for estimating the target ROA uses contemporaneous variables, 
for which Healy et al. (2014) demonstrate to be sufficient to predict the target ROA. The 
                                                 
1
 The variables used in equation (5) are different from those used in Fama and French (2006) because 
our focus is on the banking industry that they do not analyze.  
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adjustments are meaningful if there is a difference between the target ROA and the actual 
ROA. The GAP is applied to define the difference between these two variables: 
GAPit = ROA
*
it - ROAit                                                               (6) 
To test what determines the dynamic of bank earnings adjustment speed. We modify 
the empirical setup described in Equation (2) and adjust the model such that the adjustment 
speed, λ, can vary over time and banks: 
λit= λi+ Zit-1                                                                               (7) 
We assume that λit is dynamic and varies across banks and over time.   is a vector of 
coefficients for the adjustment speed function and Zit-1 is a vector of the bank and 
macroeconomic characteristics that could affect adjustment speed. Substituting Equation 
(7) into Equation (2) yields the specification for a partial adjustment model with dynamic 
adjustment speed λit, that is heterogeneous:  
ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi +  Zit-1) GAPit-1 +                                    (8) 
We follow Healy et al, (2014) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) to estimate 
Equation (8) in two steps. In the first step, we use Fama-Macbeth regression for Equation 
(5) and obtain an estimate of target ROA (i.e., ROAit*) (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; 
Healy et al, 2014). Then, we use Equation (6) to calculate the earnings GAP for each bank 
in each year. In the second stage analysis, we follow De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) and 
use OLS with bank and year fixed effects. Heterogeneity robust standard errors are 
clustered at bank level (for robustness, we also conducted several alternative clustering 
methods and our conclusions are not changed). Having running regression as in Equation 
(8), we obtain a set of coefficients  . These coefficients allow us to directly test how 
bank’s competition and earnings management influence earnings adjustment speed. The 
sign of   reflects the relationship between Z and the adjustment speed.  
 
3.5. Summary statistics  
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of variables. Appendix I shows the 
definitions of the variables. We winsorize all variables except Size at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. The mean value of target ROA is 1.048% 
and the mean value of realized ROA is 0.974%, resulting in a positive GAP of 0.09%. 
These figures are consistent with studies that use Call Reports database (Beatty et al., 
2002; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). Geographic Expansion Index ranges from zero to four 
and the mean value of this index is 2.06, indicating that the US states overall apply IBBEA 
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but create on average two barriers for interstate branching. The absolute mean value of 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (i.e., earnings management) is 0.44, which accounts 
for 0.278% of total assets (= 0.44 multiplied by the mean value of Loan to asset). The 
mean value of realized gains and losses of AFS is 0.004. 
The average Z-score of US banks is around 24. On average, US banks lend 63% of 
their assets as loans and hold 9.8% equity to assets ratio. The average total assets of US 
banks is 705 million dollars, and the median bank size is $92 million. The average asset 
growth is equal to 8.7%. The average value of one minus costs to income ratio, a proxy for 
banks’ managerial efficiency, is equal to 20.8%. The US banks, on average, generate 
around 10% of total revenue from non-interest income. Both the GDP growth and Inflation 
range from 2% to 3%. In addition, we found discretionary loan loss provisions have a 
slight increase after the introduction of IBBEA. Z-score increased from 24 to 25, on 
average. The mean of capital ratio leveled up from 9.3% to 10.2%, showing that banks in 
general reserved more equity after deregulation. The average lending and diversification 
have grown as well. Meanwhile, banks improved their cost-efficiency by 2.7%, on 
average.      
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Table 2 reports the correlations between the variables used in this study. Geographic 
Expansion Index and Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are positively correlated, 
showing that banks that operate in those states with lower regulatory restrictions use more 
earnings management. Most of the correlations are modest and the multicollinearity 
problem should be limited.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. The impact of Interstate banking deregulation on earnings adjustment speed  
Table 3 presents the regression results of Equation (4) for the first stage Fama-
MecBeth (1973) estimation. Most of the lagged variables that explain the target ROA have 
significant coefficients with expected signs, except the insignificant coefficient on Capital 
ratiot-1. The coefficient estimate on the lagged ROA indicates that the constant adjustment 
speed of earnings persistence in the first-stage specification is 0.488 per year (= 1- 0.512).   
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<Insert Table 3 here> 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the second-stage estimation of Equation (7). 
We consider a ten-year window of the introduction of IBBEA which lasts for three years 
from 1994 to 1997. Specifically, we use 5 years before and after the introduction of 
IBBEA Act for each state to examine the effect of IBBEA. Because different states adopt 
the regulation changes in different years, therefore our ten-year window vary across 
different states. For example, Ohio State instantly relieved all four restrictions on the 21th 
May 1997, therefore the data for Ohio spans a ten-year window from 1992 to 2002. On the 
other hand, Washington State firstly relieved state deposit cap restriction on the 6th June 
1996 and then gradually relieved other restrictions in following years. Since we consider a 
ten-year window around the first introduction of IBBEA, the data for Washington hence 
spans from 1991 to 2001. Thus, the overall time period for all states spans from 1989 to 
2002. This allows us to capture the effect of dramatic changes of deregulation across states 
and time.  
We standardize all the explanatory variables in the regression, except for Geographic 
Expansion Index because this index is an ordinal variable rather than a continuous variable. 
The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is positive and significant. Since a higher 
Geographic Expansion Index value indicates higher competition, a positive regression 
coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index indicates that banks in more competitive 
markets tend to adjust their earnings at a higher speed. As shown in Column (1) of Table 4, 
a one inter-quartile increase of Geographic Expansion Index leads to an increase of 
earnings adjustment speed by 0.094%. This result is in accordance with economic 
competition theory that competition impacts earnings persistence by eroding away 
economic excessive returns and losses in the long run (Stigler, 1961).  
In Column (2) of Table 4, the coefficient of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions is 
negative and significant, suggesting that banks with higher earnings management tend to 
have a slow earnings adjustment speed. Earnings adjustment speed will decrease by 4.8% 
(0.178*0.27) if Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions rises by one standard deviation. This 
result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle purpose of earnings 
management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver 
et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). In addition, we find that the coefficients of Capital 
Ratio are significant and positive, indicating that banks with higher capital ratio adjust 
earnings faster. Size shows a significantly negative impact on the adjustment speed, 
suggesting that larger banks tend to have more persistent earnings than their smaller 
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counterparts. A one standard deviation increase in Size decreases the adjustment speed by 
0.324% (0.054*0.06). Managerial Efficiency is also significantly and positively related to 
earnings adjustment speed.  
We conduct further analysis to examine whether the positive impact of bank 
competition on earnings adjustment speed is driven by those banks with earnings below 
their target (positive GAP), because these banks tend to have more incentives to adjust 
their earnings to their target levels than their better performed peer banks. We re-run the 
regressions on the subsample of banks with positive and negative GAP, respectively. The 
results are reported in Column (4) and (5) of Table 4. We find that the coefficients on 
Geographic Expansion index remain positive and significant in both specifications. It 
suggests that our main results are not driven by those banks with earnings below their 
target (positive GAP), and competition consistently erodes away the economic excessive 
returns (GAP<0) and expel losses (GAP>0) (Stigler, 1961).  
  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
We also conduct additional tests to ensure that our results presented in Table 4 are 
not driven by potential biases in the sample or due to alternative explanations. Table 5 
reports the results.  
First, there exists a potential concern that our results may be driven by states that 
time their interstate bank branching deregulations to coincide with a higher level of bank 
earnings persistence. Thus, the positive coefficient estimates on Geographic Expansion 
Index in the previous regressions may simply reflect a trend of rising adjustment speed 
after the IBBEA deregulation. To address this concern, we conduct two empirical analyses. 
First, we follow Krishnan et al. (2014), and introduce the Before (4,1) dummy variable, 
which equals one for the years t-4 to t-1 preceding the deregulation year t. This variable 
captures the difference in earnings adjustment speed of banks in each state between the 
four-year period t-4 to t-1 prior to the deregulation year t and the years prior to the four-
year period, t-5 and earlier, before the deregulation. If the deregulations are due to states 
trying to time earnings persistence or if our results above represent a secular trend in 
earnings persistence, the coefficient estimate on Before (4,1) dummy should be positive 
and statistically significant. We do not find such evidence. In Column (1) of Table 5, the 
coefficient estimate of the Before (4,1) dummy is statistically insignificant. 
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Second, if our results reflect a treatment effect of interstate bank branching 
deregulations by states, our results should disappear if we falsely assume that our treatment 
occurs one year prior to the actual deregulation year (Roberts and Whitted, 2011; Krishnan 
et al., 2014). For these tests, we repeat our main regressions of Equation (8) under such 
false definitions of Geographic Expansion Index,  which takes the index value one year 
before the actual deregulation year. Column (2) of Table 5 reports that the coefficient 
estimate on the falsified Geographic Expansion Index is statistically insignificant. This 
result confirms that interstate bank branching law were not enacted under certain 
circumstances that coincide with other unobservable characteristics that also lifted bank 
earnings persistence. Furthermore, these results also indicate that reverse causality does not 
drive our results.  
Third, in order to examine the influence of deregulation over a long time horizon, we 
expand our sample for the main regression of Equation (8) to the time period of 1986 to 
2013. As shown in Column (3) of Table 5, the coefficient is significantly positive, which is 
the same as and consistent with those reported in Table 4. Fourth, we consider the potential 
bias by banks operating in multiple states. Thus, we restrict our sample to those banks with 
only one branch and banks with size below USD 100 million, respectively. The results 
reported in column (4) and (5) are consistent with our main findings. 
Fifth, we are concerned with the confounding effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999, which allows banks to diversify into various businesses. The literature suggests 
that the GLB Act of 1999 impacts on market competition (Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan 
and Wilson, 2015) and hence may also affect bank earnings adjustment speed. However, it 
is empirically difficult to disentangle the effect of GLB Act from the impact of Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 since the impact of both Acts 
may have overlapping time periods immediately after 1999.  In order to find a clean effect 
from IBBEA 1994, we repeat our main regression analysis using the sub-sample before 
year 1999 and find consistent results reported in Column (6). Sixth, we use standard errors 
that are clustered at the bank, state and state-year level. The coefficients of Geographic 
Expansion Index across column (7) to column (9) continue to be statistically significant at 
1% level.  
Finally, in Table 5B, we conduct a robustness test using event difference-in-
difference strategy following Bertrand and Mullianathan (2003), and Chemmanur, He and 
Nandy (2010) to further test whether our main results are sensitive to different methods. 
This method captures the dynamic variation of difference between treatment and control 
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group around a particular event. It could also prevent us from producing underestimated 
small standard errors by including a too long sample period in a difference-in-difference 
estimation (Bertrand et al. 200)). We treat the introduction year of IBBEA for each state as 
our event year. We use the following model to test the dynamic impact from IBBEA on 
earnings adjustment speed: 
ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Before
t+∑Aftert+γZit-1) GAPit-1+  it,       (9) 
where GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1, Before
t 
(After
t
) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t 
years before (after) the introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before
5
 equals 
1 for year 5 before a particular state’s deregulation introduction year, and 0 otherwise. We 
find that the coefficients on After
1
, After
2
, After
3
, After
4
 are all positive and statistically 
significant. This result shows that after the introduction of deregulation, banks accelerate 
earnings adjustment speed. This effect is most pronounced 2 and 3 years after the 
introduction year. These results are consistent with our main results.  
 
<Insert Table 5A here> 
<Insert Table 5B here> 
 
4.3. The impact of banks’ heterogeneous ability to sustain earnings on earnings 
persistence 
In the previous sections we have established causality between competition and 
bank earnings adjustment speed. In this subsection, we attempt to strengthen the 
interpretation of this relation by exploring the impact of banks’ heterogenous abilities in 
sustaining earnings, which affects their earnings adjustment speed. The hypothesis is that 
the impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed should be less strong for 
banks with higher level of ability to sustain their previous years’ earnings.  
Specifically, we expect that banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, 
more efficient in management and lower level of default risk have stronger ability to 
sustain earnings. A large bank size usually indicates comprehensive strength, which may 
help banks increase their earnings persistence. Product diversification reflects banks’ 
business expansion, which increases banks’ attractiveness to customers (De Young and 
Rice (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006)). Further, income diversification effectively 
reduces earnings volatility caused by a particular external event. Banks’ safety and 
soundness could reduce banks’ default risk induced by external shocks. Efficient bank  
management not only reduces operation costs but also makes timely and effective 
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strategies to mitigate loss caused by external changes or is even able to find opportunities 
in external crises (Lin and Zhang, 2010; Shehzad et al., 2010). 
In the empirical analysis, we introduce four variables, size, diversification, 
managerial efficiency, and Z-score, and their interaction terms with the Geographic 
Expansion Index. Table 6 presents the regression results. The relations between the 
interaction terms of size, diversification, managerial efficiency and Z-score and earnings 
adjustment speed, respectively, are negative and significant. These results indicate that 
banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, higher managerial efficiency and 
lower level of default risk could persist earnings longer and hence, the impact of 
competition of earnings adjustment speed is less stronger. 
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
5. The impact of competition on earnings management 
In the previous sections we document a positive impact of bank competition and a 
negative impact of bank earnings management on bank earnings adjustment speed. Our 
findings emphasize that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is 
direct and causal. However, the accounting literature emphasizes the role of earnings 
management in shaping the relation between competition and earnings persistence (Li, 
2010; Healy et al., 2014). This argument implicitly suggests that competition may 
indirectly impact earnings persistence through the channel of earnings management 
because an increased competition could lead to lower level of earnings management. The 
reasoning is that competition increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing the 
incentives of earnings management. With more competitive rivals, firms are more likely to 
lose their shareholders, customers and suppliers due to the damage of reputation caused by 
misreporting (Graham et al., 2005). Consequently, it is possible that competition reduces 
earnings management and that such a reduced earnings management results in a lower 
level of earnings persistence, or equivalently speaking, a higher speed of earnings 
adjustment, as we found in. We investigate whether this indirect channel may exist and 
drive our main results by using two earnings management models in this section.  
 
 
5.1. The impact of competition on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP) 
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          In this subsection we examine the direct impact of bank competition on bank 
earnings management, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions. If it is indeed 
that bank competition impact on earnings persistence indirectly through the earnings 
management channel, we would expect a negative relationship between the Geographic 
Expansion Index and our bank earnings management measure, otherwise the impact of 
competition on earnings adjustment speed would not be positive.  
Table 7 presents the results. The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is 
significantly positive, indicating the positive impact of bank competition on earnings 
management. In Column (1), a one inter-quartile increase in the Geographic Expansion 
Index leads to an increase of 0.008% in Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. These results 
support the recent growing studies that find that bank competition encourages bank 
earnings management. For instance, Tomy et al. (2016) argue that banks would inflate loss 
provisions, which reduces reported earnings and hence discourages the entry of new banks. 
Dou, Ryan, and Zou (2016) argue that banks would suppress loan provisions, which 
creates the impression of high underwriting quality and hence helps deter the entry of new 
banks. Our evidence does not support the notion that competition reduces earnings 
management (see, e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2016; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et 
al., 2016).  
We further examine whether the impact of bank competition on earnings 
management is driven by banks with earnings above their targets (GAP<0), because these 
outperforming banks have more incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid sudden drops in 
earnings. We thus re-run the regressions with two sub-samples of banks with earnings 
below (GAP>0) and above (GAP<0) their target, respectively. Column (2) and (3) of Table 
7 report the results. We find that the coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is 
significantly positive only in the GAP<0 regression but not in the GAP>0 regression. 
These results indicate that the impact of bank competition on earnings management is 
driven by banks that have higher ROA than their targets (GAP<0). 
 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
 
5.2. The impact of competition on bank earnings management through Available 
for Sale Securities (AFS securities) 
Prior research documents that banks tend to use the item of available for sale (AFS) 
securities to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2017; Dong and Zhang, 2015). AFS securities is 
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the largest category of banks’ securities and contains a sizable proportion of bank assets 
(Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 
320 specifies that AFS securities should be measured as fair value in the statement of 
financial position, with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income. 
Hence, the accounting treatment for gains and losses from AFS securities provides banks a 
chance to engage in earnings management by selling these securities and realizing selected 
gains and losses. After the announcement of Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 320, 
it is increasingly popular that banks use AFS securities to manage earnings due to large 
size of this item and lower cost of managing this item (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux 
and Leuz, 2010).  
In this Section, we examine whether competition induce earnings smoothing via 
utilizing the AFS securities. Following Barth et al. (2017) and Dong and Zhang (2015), we 
use realized gains and losses of AFS securities model to capture bank earnings 
management. We estimate the following model: 
  AFS securitiesit =   Net Incomeit +    Competitionit  
                             +    Net Incomeit х Competitionit   
                                           +   Discretionary Loan Loss Provisionsit +  Z-scoreit  
                             +   Capital Ratioit +   Loan to Total Assetit +   Sizeit  
                             +   Total Assets Growth Rateit +    Managerial Efficiencyit  
                             +    Income Diversificationit +    GDP Growth Rateit  
                             +    Inflationit +    GDP Per Capitait +                   (10) 
where AFS securitiesit is realized gains and losses on AFS securities and Net Incomeit is net 
income before taxes and gains and losses on AFS securities, both deflated by beginning-of-
year total assets. Competitionit is the Geographic Expansion Index. If banks employ AFS 
securities to maintain persistent earnings, the coefficient on Net Incomeit,    , should be 
negative, and if banks under more competition realize more gains from AFS securities, the 
coefficient on Competitionit,   , should be positive. Our interested coefficient is   , the 
interaction term between Net Incomeit and Competitionit.. It tests whether earnings 
smoothing is more pronounced for banks under higher competition. A negative    implies 
that competition would directly intensify banks earnings smoothing behavior. 
2
 
The results are reported in Table 8. In column (1), net income before tax is 
negatively related to realized gains and losses of AFS securities. This finding suggests that 
                                                 
2
 It is worth to note that the model of Barth et al., (2017) only allows us to check whether banks use 
AFS securities to smooth earnings, but not the magnitude of this earnings management. 
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banks use AFS securities to smooth earnings, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2017). 
The interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income is insignificant, 
indicating that bank competition does not induce more earnings smoothing by utilizing 
AFS securities. Column (2) and (3) consistently show insignificant coefficients on the 
interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income when we consider the 
sub-samples when GAP >0 and GAP<0, respectively. These results further confirm our 
main findings that bank competition has a direct rather than indirect impact on bank 
earnings persistence through the channel of earnings management.  
 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study investigates whether the effect of competition on bank earnings 
persistence is direct or indirect through the channel of earnings management. We employ a 
sample of commercial banks in the U.S. from 1986 to 2013. We use the introduction of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) as a natural experiment of 
competition, which could effectively mitigate endogeneity issues in prior research. By 
applying a two-stage partial adjustment model, we find a negative impact of competition 
on earnings persistence, consistent with economic competition theory that competition 
could directly impact earnings persistence. Further, we fail to find a negative relation 
between competition and earnings management, although we find a positive relation 
between earnings management and persistence. Therefore, our evidence rules out the 
possibility that competition could indirectly decrease earnings persistence through the 
channel of earnings management. 
Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to understand bank 
earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is to pay attention to form a 
healthy competition environment for existing banks while at the same time encourage 
information disclosure quality. As a result, investors could obtain more valuable 
information regarding banks performance and the banking industry could become more 
stable, contributing to the stability of the financial system.  
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Table 1 
Panel A Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for banks during the period of five years before and five years after the 
year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. ROA* is estimated using the first stage of the partial 
adjustment model, ROAit =λi iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+  it, GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1.  ΔROA= ROAit-ROAit-1. We 
use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the ROA* in the first stage. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Target ROA(ROA*) 77929 1.048 0.530 -2.834 2.424 
ROA 77929 0.974 0.723 -4.440 2.961 
GAP 77929 0.091 0.766 -2.908 4.520 
ΔROA 77929 0.030 0.682 -7.401 7.401 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 
77929 0.435 0.270 0.011 1.319 
Realized gains and losses 
of AFS 
77929 0.004 0.052 -6.433 8.044 
Geographic Expansion 
Index 
77929 2.060 1.907 0.000 4.000 
Z-score 77929 24.132 17.069 0.428 83.816 
Capital Ratio 77929 9.799 3.460 3.992 36.872 
Loan to Total Asset 77929 63.118 20.751 13.274 148.805 
Total Assets (million) 77929 705.256 15091.220 0.723 1746242.000 
Size (Log total Asset) 77929 11.339 1.296 8.679 15.734 
Total Assets Growth  77929 8.686 15.879 -18.691 125.575 
Managerial Efficiency 77929 20.808 8.741 -4.076 45.923 
Income Diversification 77929 10.131 7.519 0.492 53.253 
Inflation 27 2.463 0.763 0.879 3.793 
GDP Growth 27 2.746 1.585 -3.109 4.869 
GDP Per Capita 27 10.307 0.304 9.822 10.819 
Panel B Summary statistics around IBBEA introduction  
This table presents summary of interested variables before and after the introduction of IBBEA in each state for a 10 year 
window.*, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
  Before Deregulation After Deregulation   
Difference in 
Mean 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
After-Before 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 
 
0.001*** 
Z-score 24.403 20.883 16.868 25.167 21.120 17.292 
 
0.764*** 
Capital Ratio 9.340 8.629 3.118 10.242 9.355 3.591 
 
0.009*** 
Loan to Total Asset 58.978 59.180 19.226 66.213 66.083 19.950 
 
0.072** 
Total Assets (million) 318566 55412 2864378 581112 77803 6957687 
 
262545*** 
Total Assets Growth Rate 7.806 5.004 15.205 10.424 6.812 16.924 
 
2.61762*** 
Managerial Efficiency 22.148 22.195 7.687 19.387 19.216 7.601 
 
-2.761*** 
Income Diversification 9.198 7.667 6.498 10.082 8.404 7.313    0.884*** 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation covariance. * denotes the 5% significance level. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.  
  
Geographic 
Expansion 
Index 
Discretiona
ry Loan 
Loss 
Provisions 
Z-score 
Capital 
ratio 
Loan to 
total asset 
Size 
Total 
Assets 
Growth  
Managerial 
efficiency 
Income 
diversificati
on 
Inflation 
GDP 
growth  
GDP per 
capita 
Geographic 
Expansion 
Index 
1 
        
  
 
Discretionary 
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
0.0728* 1 
       
  
 
Z-score 0.0267* -0.2257* 1 
      
  
 
Capital ratio 0.1970* -0.2168* 0.3399* 1 
     
  
 
Loan to total 
asset 
0.2542* 0.4709* -0.2191* -0.1983* 1 
    
  
 
Size 0.3104* 0.1196* -0.0026 -0.1127* 0.3062* 1 
   
  
 
Total Assets 
Growth  
0.0390* 0.1413* -0.1349* -0.0899* 0.5593* 0.1602* 1 
  
  
 
Managerial 
efficiency 
-0.2891* -0.1342* 0.1934* 0.2947* 0.1186* 0.2862* 0.0205* 1 
 
  
 
Income 
diversification 
0.1889* 0.0039 -0.1554* 0.0560* 0.0389* 0.2982* 0.0499* -0.1032* 1   
 
Inflation -0.4282* -0.0004 -0.0239* -0.1188* -0.0893* -0.1314* -0.0162* 0.2305* -0.1297* 1  
 
GDP growth  -0.1653* -0.2515* 0.0101* -0.0389* -0.0445* -0.1141* 0.0231* -0.0117* -0.0621* -0.0031 1 
 
GDP per capita 0.3786* -0.2058* 0.0115* 0.2171* 0.2440* 0.3250* 0.0155* -0.3318* 0.2311* -0.3904* -0.3128* 1 
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Table 3 
First Stage Partial Adjustment Model 
This table reports the results of the first-stage partial adjustment model assuming a static earnings 
adjustment speed. ROAit =λi iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+  it, where (1- λi) is the level of persistence of 
ROA. In column (1), we follow Fama and French (2006) and Healy et al. (2014) to use Fama-Macbeth 
regression for estimating ROA. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. In this regression, we use the original values of these ratios instead of 
percentages. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent Variable ROAt 
ROAt-1 0.512*** 
 
(22.06) 
Revenuet-1 0.005*   
 
(1.74) 
Capital ratiot-1 0.066 
 
(0.37) 
Loanst-1 -0.027*** 
 
(-4.54)    
Total Assetst-1 -0.004**  
 
(-2.21)    
Diversificationt-1 0.004*** 
 
(3.42) 
Managerial Efficiencyt-1 0.129*** 
 
(13.97)    
Growth of Total Assetst-1  0.002*** 
 
(6.11) 
Constant -0.456** 
 
(-2.02) 
  
N 77929 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: a ten-year window of IBBEA     
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment 
Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1 ) GAPit-1 +  it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) over the ten-year 
period in which no more than five years are distant from the IBBEA introduction year. Discretionary 
Loan Loss Provisions are the proxy for earnings management across all columns. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix 
presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
   
Below 
target 
Above 
target 
    GAP>0 GAP<0 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.094***  0.090*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 
 
(7.38)  (8.70) (11.09) (7.11)    
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 
 
-0.178*** -0.176*** 0.041*** -0.069*** 
  
(-4.25) (-4.22) (9.66) (-10.21) 
Z-score -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.116*** 
 
(-1.63) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-0.68) (-12.46)    
Capital Ratio 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.005 0.007 
 
(3.14) (3.21) (3.21) (-1.13) (1.27) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 0.062*** -0.003 
 
(-0.60) (-0.96) (-0.96) (9.13) (-0.39)    
Size -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.074*** 
 
(-5.03) (-5.04) (-5.04) (-5.34) (-9.65)    
Total Assets Growth  0.006 0.008 0.008 -0.023*** 0.021*** 
 
(1.28) (1.43) (1.43) (-5.52) (3.84) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.004 -0.072*** 
 
(-4.11) (-4.22) (-4.22) (-1.09) (-11.99) 
Income Diversification -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.018*** -0.039*** 
 
(-1.03) (-1.11) (-1.11) (5.45) (-6.43)    
Inflation 0.017 0.019 0.019 -0.049*** -0.068*** 
 (1.12) (1.34) (1.34) (-8.49) (-11.91)    
GDP Growth  0.013 0.014 0.014 -0.119*** 0.019*** 
 (1.39) (1.50) (1.50) (-21.74) (3.38) 
GDP Per Capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.383*** -0.197*** 
 (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-25.28) (-14.22)    
Constant 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.850*** 0.738*** 
 (9.66) (9.70) (9.70) (54.33) (51.39) 
      
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 77929 77929 77929 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.792 0.793 0.793 0.659 0.613 
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Table 5A 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Robust Analysis 
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. This table presents the placebo tests of the OLS results for parameter estimates on 
Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi +γZit-1)GAPit-1 +  it, GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). Column (1) shows the results controlling for the four years prior to the deregulation 
year. Before (4, 1) is a dummy variable equals one for year -4 to -1 relative to the deregulation year. Columns (2) displays the results under which Geographic Expansion Index variable is the 
actual index for one year prior to the actual deregulation. Column (3) displays the regression results for both large banks and their smaller counterparts. Column (4) presents the regression 
results using the full sample. Column (5) to (7) present the regression results using the sub samples, while (8) to (10) show regression results using different standard errors clustering method. t-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 
Before(4,1) 
dummy 
Falsified one-
year before 
Geographic 
Expansion  
Index 
Full sample 
Banks with  
only one 
branch 
Banks with 
total  
assets 
smaller than  
100million 
Before  
GLB Act 
Bank-level 
clustering 
State-level 
clustering 
State-year- 
level 
clustering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Geographic Expansion  
Index 
0.088*** -0.007 0.071*** 0.016*** 0.082*** 0.029*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 
(18.85) (-1.36) (18.33) (3.55) (6.35) (6.16) (12.01) (3.80) (4.74) 
Before (4,1) 0.011         
 
(0.05)         
Geographic Expansion Index*Large Banks          
          
Geographic Expansion Index*(1-Large Banks)          
          
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.082*** -0.021** -0.126** -0.126* -0.126*** 
 
(-3.27) (-2.58) (-5.87) (-3.14) (-5.51) (-2.19) (-2.32) (-1.89) (-2.63) 
Early Deregulation Index  0.019** 0.017**       
  (2.31) (2.21)       
Z-score -0.013*** -0.032*** -0.058*** -0.090*** -0.050*** -0.061*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 
(-12.11) (-5.68) (-12.25) (-9.12) (-7.36) (-6.49) (-7.79) (-8.46) (-10.72) 
Leverage Ratio 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.201*** -0.001 0.004 0.019*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(3.64) (3.79) (-3.27) (-0.17) (0.76) (4.42) (2.26) (2.41) (2.49) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.058*** 0.000 0.049*** 0.033** 0.001 -0.007 -0.026*** -0.026** -0.026*** 
 
(13.33) (0.02) (11.66) (2.62) (0.13) (-0.83) (-2.86) (-2.44) (-2.86) 
Size -0.049*** -0.076*** -0.062*** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
 
(-5.62) (-8.93) (-11.57) (-6.92) (-6.83) (-9.71) (-11.90) (-13.42) (-19.08) 
Total Assets Growth  0.004 0.004 -0.011*** -0.002 0.017*** -0.002 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.85) (1.14) (-3.25) (-0.26) (3.37) (-0.38) (2.82) (3.43) (3.01) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
 
(-4.34) (-9.60) (-7.61) (-3.97) (-9.56) (-4.93) (-14.06) (-13.61) (-16.58) 
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Income Diversification -0.010** -0.007* 0.000 -0.012* -0.013** -0.034*** -0.013** -0.013 -0.013*** 
 
(-2.28) (-1.90) (0.03) (-2.00) (-2.01) (-4.77) (-2.10) (-1.64) (-2.60) 
GDP Growth  0.015 0.001 -0.075*** -0.054*** -0.114*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(1.62) (0.29) (-25.29) (-5.86) (-15.15) (-0.76) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.88) 
Inflation 0.006 -0.019*** -0.056*** -0.029*** 0.048*** 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.47) (-3.51) (-16.63) (-3.33) (2.97) (1.21) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) 
GDP Per Capita -0.321*** -0.121*** -0.354*** -0.192*** -0.592*** 0.114*** 0.047 0.047 0.047 
 
(-45.30) (-37.27) (-43.49) (-8.84) (-19.46) (5.75) (1.09) (1.24) (0.94) 
Constant 0.896*** 0.857*** 0.823*** 0.659*** 1.124*** 0.750*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 
 
(80.29) (85.79) (88.14) (26.71) (24.80) (43.23) (19.55) (21.07) (16.69) 
          
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 77929 226153 42942 102551 140572 77929 77929 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.826 0.808 0.701 0.777 0.614 0.826 0.697 0.697 0.697 
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Table 5B 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Robustness checks 
 We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment 
Model. We use the event DID results. [ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Before
t
+∑Aftert+ γZit-1) GAPit-1+  it, GAPit-
1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1], Before
t
(After
t
) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years before(after) the 
introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before
5
 equals 1 for year 5 before a state’s first 
time deregulation, and 0 otherwise. We apply OLS regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables.  
  (1) 
Before 5 -0.037** 
 
(-2.57) 
Before 4 -0.031* 
 
(-1.82) 
Before 3 0.006 
 
(0.37) 
Before 2 -0.020 
 
(-1.21) 
Before 1 0.011 
 
(0.90) 
After 1 0.034*** 
 
(2.59) 
After 2 0.258*** 
 
(4.02) 
After 3 0.1190* 
 
(1.78) 
After 4 0.032** 
 
(2.56) 
After 5 0.008 
 
(0.61) 
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions -0.113* 
 
(-1.89) 
Constant 0.7585*** 
 
(112.92) 
Bank Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
N 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.687 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Heterogeneity 
This table investigates the potential mechanisms between earnings adjustment speed and bank 
competition. The Geographic Expansion measure is a state level competition measure. Following Rice 
and Strahan (2010), Geographic Expansion is an index that captures the level of interstate Geographic 
Expansion for each state. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Size -0.034***  
  
 
(-6.28)  
  Geographic Expansion  
Index *Income Diversification  -0.011*** 
  
 
 (-2.93) 
  Geographic Expansion  
Index *Managerial Efficiency   -0.037*** 
 
  
 (-5.83) 
 Geographic Expansion  
Index *Z-score 
 
 
 
-0.007*** 
  
 
 
(-3.45)    
Geographic Expansion  
Index 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 
 
(4.27) (6.68) (5.96) (7.43)    
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.021*** 
 
(-4.75) (-5.17) (-3.84) (-5.13)    
Z-score -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.114*** 
 
(-17.28) (-16.69) (-18.56) (-11.45)    
Capital Ratio -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003    
 
(-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.56) (-0.43)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.070*** 
 
(13.62) (13.12) (10.11) (13.31)    
Size -0.033*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.064*** 
 
(-4.02) (-12.13) (-12.95) (-12.09)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 
(-4.75) (-4.39) (-2.63) (-4.37)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.107*** -0.042*** -0.012*** -0.036*** 
 
(-5.14) (-8.38) (-2.89) (-7.52)    
Income Diversification 0.005* -0.018*** 0.004 -0.000    
 
(1.80) (-2.84) (1.26) (-0.06)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078*** 
 
(-23.47) (-23.67) (-23.87) (-23.88)    
Inflation -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.070*** -0.074*** 
 
(-21.85) (-22.31) (-22.03) (-22.60)    
GDP Per Capita -0.261*** -0.254*** -0.249*** -0.256*** 
 
(-41.61) (-41.39) (-40.17) (-41.87)    
Constant 0.980*** 0.634*** 0.691*** 0.618*** 
 
(18.76) (70.01) (103.31) (48.61)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 226153 226153 226153 
adj. R-sq 0.707 0.707 0.708 0.7073  
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Table 7 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full 
sample, and when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The dependent 
variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to 
independent variable, competition is measured by Geographic Expansion Index. *, **, *** denote 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    Below target Above target 
  Full Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.00008**  0.00000 0.00002**  
 
(1.97)    (0.77) (2.32)    
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 
(-10.20)    (-1.52) (-14.93) 
Leverage Ratio -0.001 0.002** -0.003*** 
 
(-1.14)    (1.98) (-3.29) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 
(131.77) (108.44) (94.53) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(8.56) (3.41) (7.71) 
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-70.73)    (-49.13) (-53.47) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 
(-13.86) (-0.89) (-3.81) 
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(4.99) (6.23) (4.07) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-89.79)    (-49.22) (-49.38) 
Inflation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-185.22)    (-177.35) (-95.00) 
GDP Per Capita 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 
(52.89) (30.66) (34.03) 
Constant -0.456*** -0.388*** -0.457*** 
 
(-52.25)    (-29.25) (-31.92) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    N 214403 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.776 0.778 0.771 
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Table 8 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Realized gains/losses of AFS 
This table investigates whether competition induces banks earnings management using realized 
gains/losses of available for sale securities, when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or 
GAP>0). The dependent variable is Realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. NI is net income 
before tax and realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. The Geographic Expansion Index 
measure is a state level competition measure. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** 
represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    Below target Above target 
  Full Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
NI -0.048*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 
(-26.62) (-24.04) (-18.07) 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.000 0.000001* 0.000 
 
(0.16) (1.69) (1.04) 
NI*Geographic Expansion Index -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.83) (0.53) (1.46) 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 0.035*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 
(10.01) (1.19) (6.36) 
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 
 
(-2.91) (-1.87) (1.39) 
Leverage Ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 
(0.22) (-0.47) (3.20) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-6.34) (-7.51) (-8.48) 
Size 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(2.73) (9.52) (6.42) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 
(3.43) (4.59) (1.43) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-23.05) (-22.31) (-14.51) 
Income Diversification -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-7.84) (-5.38) (-3.89) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.003*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 
(8.72) (1.19) (3.91) 
Inflation -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-8.00) (-6.73) (-3.55) 
GDP Per Capita -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 
(-6.67) (5.48) (1.98) 
Constant 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(1.51) (-9.50) (-5.42) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 146338 78491 47324 
adj. R-sq 0.112 0.079 0.081 
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Appendix 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Earnings Management 
measure  
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 
The Earnings Management measures the discretionary loan loss provisions 
manipulated by each bank. It is obtained from the discretionary loan loss 
provision model (Cohen et al., 2014). We treat the absolute value of the error 
term as the earnings management indicator. The Higher the absolute residual 
value, the more earnings management the bank applied. 
Competition Measures 
 
Geographic Expansion 
Index 
The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) is an 
exogenous shock of competition. Followed by Rice and Strahan (2010), 
Geographic Expansion Index captures the level of interstate branching 
restrictions for each state. Before 1994, the index in each state equals to 
zero, while, after 1994, this index ranges from zero to four. The index equals 
to four for states that are most open to out-of-state entry. Then, we minus 
one to the index when a state has any of the four barriers: requiring a 
minimum age of 3 or more years on the acquiring banks; not allowing de 
novo interstate branching; not permitting the acquisition of single branch or 
portions of an institution; mandating a deposit cap on branch acquisitions 
less than 30%. Thus, 4 means highest competition and 0 means lowest 
competition 
 
Bank-controls 
 
Z-score 
The Z-score is an accounting-based bank-level indicator of financial 
stability. It is measured by the sum of return of total assets and capital ratio 
over the standard deviation of return of total assets. We use 3-year rolling 
window to estimate standard deviation of ROA. Higher Z-score indicates 
greater financial stability.  
Capital Ratio The ratio of total equity to total assets 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Total Assets Growth  The yearly total assets growth rate 
Managerial Efficiency One minus the ratio of total cost to total income 
Income Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
Loans to total assets.  The ratio of total loans to total assets 
Early Deregulation Index 
Early Deregulation Index represents the wave of deregulation before 
IBBEA.  This index equals zero prior to the earlier of the year of intra- or 
inter-state deregulations, one if the state deregulates either full intra-state 
branching through acquisition and de novo branching or inter-state banking, 
and two if the state deregulates both types of branching expansions. The 
years of these deregulations are gained from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
Macro-controls 
 
GDP Growth  Annual GDP growth rate 
Inflation Annual inflation growth rate 
GDP per capita GDP divided by the number of the people in the country 
